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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

DALE PHILLIP TAYLOR,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 930784-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in taking under advisement

Appellant's motion to dismiss the Theft by Deception charge
rather than ruling on it promptly, before requiring Appellant to
present his case.
Standard of Review: Appellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is for correctness. State v.
Pena, 232, Utah Adv. Rep., 3, 4 (Utah 1994); State v.
Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) see Kennecott Corp.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
II.

Whether the prosecutor's questioning of Appellant on cross

examination was improper and requires reversal.
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question
of law and fact. "[A]11 applications of law to findings
of fact that produce conclusions of law are reviewed
under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness."
State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1994), State
v.Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules are contained in
Addendum A.
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV
Utah State Const. Art. 1 § 7
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 05 (1953 as amended)
Rules
Utah R.Crim.P. 17 (o) (1993)
Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a) (1993)
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) (1993)
Utah R. Evid. 611(b) (1993)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding.
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on September 29, 1993
and was sentenced on October 29, 1993 to a term of zero to five
years at the Utah State Prison.

The prison term was suspended

and Appellant was placed on probation.
The Notice of Appeal was filed November 26, 1993.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 21, 1993, Appellant went into Fankhouser Jewelry
which is owned and operated by Miriam Davis and her husband, (R.
274, 279, 324, 378). Appellant testified at trial that he
brought two rings into the store seeking appraisals on both, (R.
378-79).

He also testified that Mrs. Davis took both rings into

the back of the store for up to ten minutes, (R. 379-80).
Appellant testified further that when Mrs. Davis returned, she
told him that one ring was worth about $ 4,000.00, and she
offered to buy it from him for $ 2,500.00 in cash or $ 3,000.00
in trade and cash, (R. 380, 382).
Mrs. Davis testified that Appellant came into the store and
asked if she would be interested in buying a diamond ring that he
had, (R. 280). She also testified that Appellant told her that
the ring belonged to his wife, (R. 289).
After examining the ring, Mrs. Davis gave Appellant, in
exchange for the ring, a $ 750.00 watch, a $ 975.00 man's ring
and a check made out for $ 1,275.00, (R. 284-86).

She asked him

not to cash the check until the next day, saying she was unsure
if she had sufficient funds to cover the check, (R. 286-87) .
Appellant left the store and went to her bank where he cashed the
check after learning that her account did have sufficient funds
to cover the check, (R. 294, 384-85).
Approximately three hours after his first visit, Appellant
returned to Fankhouser Jewelry because he was unable to properly
set the watch he had been given, in part, for the ring, (R. 292,
3

325, 3 86).

He was almost immediately confronted by Linda Davis,

Mrs. Davis' daughter, who told him that they had discovered,
after he had left the store earlier, that the stone in the ring
he sold them was a cubic zirconium rather than a diamond, (R.
325, 387).

She demanded that Appellant immediately return the

check, watch and ring he'd been given in exchange for the ring,
(R. 330, 387-88).

Appellant did not do so, and he left the store

and headed to his car in the parking lot, followed by Ms. Davis,
(R. 326,327, 329, 389-90).
When Appellant arrived at his car, Ms. Davis was right
behind him, (R. 33 0, 3 94).

As he opened the car door, she tried

to stop him from doing so, but he was able to get into the car
and start it by putting the keys in the ignition, (R. 330, 395).
Ms. Davis reached in through the open driver's side door, grabbed
the keys, and turned the car off, (Id.).
The testimony at trial of Appellant and Ms. Davis differed
greatly regarding what happened next.

Appellant testified that

he started the car again and that Ms. Davis walked over to an
area some distance away, (R. 397-98).

He further stated that he

backed up and drove out of the parking lot, never coming closer
to Ms. Davis than approximately twenty feet, (R. 401). Ms. Davis
testified that, after restarting the car, Appellant drove
straight towards her, coming to within a foot or two of her; she
said she had to jump out of the way to avoid being hit by the
car, (R. 331).
Appellant was charged with two offenses--Theft by Deception
4
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The trial court's

failure to rule promptly on the motion constituted reversible
error; the State did not establish a prima facie case of Theft by
Deception which required the trial judge to dismiss the charge
rather than requiring Defendant/Appellant to present evidence in
his defense.

Further, the trial court's error was prejudicial

because it impacted the decision of the jury.
The prosecutor's questioning of the Appellant on crossexamination was improper and harmful.

The failed to support his

allegations in his cross-examination of Appellant with evidence,
thereby calling improper matters to the juror's attention.

The

prosecutor's question asking Appellant to comment on the veracity
of another witness' testimony was argumentative and sought
information beyond Appellant's competence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TAKING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE THEFT BY DECEPTION CHARGE UNDER
ADVISEMENT RATHER THAN RULING ON IT PROMPTLY.
A.

The trial court should have ruled promptly on Appellant's
motion to dismiss.
Appellant was entitled to a prompt ruling on his motion to

dismiss the Theft by Deception charge, see State v. Emmett, 839
P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).

In Emmett, the Supreme Court of Utah said:

[Utah Code Ann. § ] 77-17-3 clearly entitles the
defendant to an immediate ruling on the sufficiency of
the prosecution's case at the close of its case. The
trial judge should at that time "rule promptly upon such
a motion so that the defendant may decide whether or not
to proceed with the introduction of evidence in his
defense." The purpose of the rule is to "avoid forcing
a defendant into going forward with his own evidence when
the State's case is insufficient."
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did not waive his claim, and the error is reversible because the
court forced the Appellant to present evidence in his defense
even though the State failed to establish a prima facie case of
the theft by deception charge against Appellant.

Further,

reversible error occurred here because the trial court's actions
impacted the decision of the jury.
B.

The Trial Court should have dismissed the Theft by
Deception charge because the State failed to establish a
prima facie case.
When a motion to dismiss a charge for insufficiency of the

evidence is made, "the trial court should dismiss the charge if
the State did not establish a prima facie case against the
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all of the
elements of the crime charged.'" Emmett, 839 P.2d at 784 (quoting
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 534 (Utah 1983)).

Here the State

failed to present believable evidence regarding the element of
intent to support a charge of theft by deception.

"A person

commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953 as amended).

'Deception' is defined in

section 76-6-401(5); the applicable sections are as follows:
'Deception' occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an
impression of law or fact that is false and
that the actor does not believe to be true and
that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction; or
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(R. 2 ; ' 7)

M r s . Davis

testified .that she deals with diamonds on a daily basis, either
buying, selling, or appraising them (R. 297), and that she has
had training in the area of identifying gems and has attended
various jewelry seminars (R. 278, 297).
Mrs. Davis testified that Appellant brought in "a ring that
is fourteen karat yellow gold band about six millimeters wide,
had a finish on it, not bright and shiny, and had a karat size
stone on it." (R. 280). Mrs. Davis stated that she looked at the
stone, and measured it with a plastic gauge to determine the
sized of the stone, according to millimeter size (R. 282).

In

looking at the stone, Mrs. Davis said its color was very good,
"indicating that it was a better stone." (R. 283). After
examining the stone thus far, Mrs. Davis testified that she
"thought it was a diamond." (R. 284).
On cross examination, Mrs. Davis testified that she examined
the stone by looking at it with her naked eye, measuring it with
both a plastic gauge with circles on it and a millimeter gauge,
and by looking at it with an instrument called a ten power loop
(R. 300-02).

Mrs. Davis testified that she then made an offer to

Appellant to purchase his ring which he accepted and then left
the store (R. 284-87).
Mrs. Davis testified that after Appellant left the store,
she tested the stone twice with her diamond testing machine, and
both times the machine indicated that the stone was not a genuine
diamond (R. 287-88).

The State brought the diamond tester to

trial for demonstrative purposes, and Mrs. Davis used her own
10
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diamonds and examination of this particular stone, believed at
the time of the transaction that the stone was genuine. Mrs.
Davis' testimony that the entire transaction--from the time
Appellant entered the store until the time that he left--took
twenty to twenty-five minutes (R. 3 06) demonstrates that in no
way did Appellant prevent Mrs. Davis from acquiring information
likely to affect her judgment in the transaction.

Had Appellant

intended to deceive the Davises by selling them a zircon rather
than a diamond, he surely would not have returned to the scene of
his alleged crime three hours later seeking an adjustment on his
watch.
C. The Trial Court's error in taking under advisement Appellant's
motion to dismiss the Theft by Deception charge impacted the
decision of the jury.
The trial court's error is reversible because it impacted
the jury's decision.

The test used in determining when an error

warrants reversal is whether, upon a review of the record as a
whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error a
different result would have occurred. Emmett, 83 9 P.2d at 784;
see e.g., State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); State v.
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 & n. 1 (Utah 1987); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a).

"[T]his

determination is best made by viewing this error in conjunction
with other errors that occurred during the trial, specifically,
instances of prosecutorial misconduct." Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785;
see Point II., infra

at p. 17.

Because the trial judge reserved ruling on Appellant's
12
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na_ Appellant

had told her that the ring belonged to his wife, (R. 288, 289).
The State questioned Appellant relentlessly on cross-examination
regarding the origin of the ring, (R. 403-07); see Addendum D.
In response to the State's questioning, Appellant repeatedly
denied telling Mrs. Davis that the ring belonged to his wife,
(Id.).

Appellant had previously testified on direct that he had

found the ring in a washing machine a couple days before he took
it to Fankhouser Jewelry, (R. 3 75).

The State had not brought

this fact out in its case in chief, and it seized upon it on
cross examination to show the jury that Appellant lied to Mrs.
Davis when he told her it belonged to his wife, (R. 4 02-07); see
Addendum D.

Further, in closing argument, the prosecutor used

this fact to destroy Appellant's credibility, stating:
And in this case, we have a con. He misrepresented to
start with that it was his own property. If you believe
his version of the facts that he never said it was his
wife's, or his ex-wife's, then manifested that it was his
own property by saying give money for this, giving the
impression that he has a right to the proceeds of that,
that's not his property. That's a misrepresentation that
he brought up. The State didn't bring it up at all.
(R. 462)
Mrs.
Appellant

Davis

also

represented

testified
to

her

several

that

the

times
ring

on
he

direct
had

with

that
him

contained a diamond, (R. 280, 284, 288) . Again, the State's crossexamination of Appellant belabored him regarding this issue, and
Appellant testified that he based his belief that the stone was a
diamond on Mrs. Davis' offer and exchange of expensive merchandise
for the ring,

(R. 414-17); see Addendum D.

Despite Appellant's

testimony that he did not know the ring contained a zircon, the
14

prosecutor argued the following in his closing argument:
What are the odds of two imitation rings being presented
at the same time, and Defendant not knowing that either
one on them was phony? That's one of the things you have
to consider. What were the remaining misrepresentations?
The ultimate one is creating the impression the ring was
a diamond when he did not believe this to be true.
(R. 463)
On direct, Mrs. Davis testified that Appellant told her
specifically that he wanted to sell the ring (R. 280, 284). On
cross, Appellant testified that he went to the store because he
sought appraisals on two rings, and he wanted to find out whether
the ring contained a genuine diamond (R. 407, 412, 414).
Mrs. Davis testified on direct that when she gave Appellant
a check for $ 1,275.00 as partial payment for the ring, she asked
him not to cash it until the next day because she did not think
she had enough money in her account to cover the check (R. 287).
She also stated that Appellant agreed to these terms (Id.), but
that Appellant cashed the check the same day she gave it to him
(R. 293) .

On cross-examination, the State used this issue to

shatter Appellant's character by making Appellant look like a bad
person for cashing the check one day too soon (R. 419). The
testimony was as follows:
Q.

Do you remember the instructions from Mrs. Davis telling you

that there would not be money in the account until tomorrow; is
that correct?
A.

She said that she had to make a deposit later that

afternoon, or the next morning.
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Q.

And she asked you to wait; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But you didn't wait, did you?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Why didn't you?

A.

I wanted to see if the check was good.

Q.

Once you found out the check was good, and there was money

in the account, why didn't you wait?
A.

If it would have been post-dated, I would have.

Q.

Did you think it might inconvenience her to have her checks

bouncing because you took the check out before she said that you
could?
A.

I did not force this woman to write a check.
The prosecutor used this issue in closing argument to malign

Appellant's character, saying:
They told him not to cash the check until the next day.
Now, I'm not sure what his reasoning was, or what people
go through that reasoning of checking to see if
somebody's reputable by going and trying to make them
have all their checks bounce by getting your check in
first.
How that leads you to believe whether or not
somebody is reputable or not when they say wait for the
following day, I don't understands [sic] how this would.
(R. 464)
Appellant's character and credibility would not have
suffered so severely had he not been subject to cross-examination
on the theft by deception charge.

If the jury believed Appellant

was testifying untruthfully as to the theft by deception charge,
they could have easily believed Appellant testified untruthfully
as to both charges.

Further, had only the aggravated assault
16

charge been submitted to the jury for deliberation, the jury may
not have convicted Appellant of any crime at all.
Review of this issue is appropriate because defense counsel
properly preserved the issue for appeal.

Defense counsel moved

to dismiss both counts against Appellant at the close of the
State's case in chief.

The motions to dismiss preserved the

issue for appeal, see Emmett.

In Emmett, the court addressed

this precise issue, stating:
We have never required criminal defendants who have
properly presented a claim to take exception to a trial
court's erroneous ruling in order to preserve the issue
for appeal. Rather, our case law establishes that the
doctrine of waiver has application if defendants fail
to raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial
level, so the trial judge has a opportunity to rule on
the issue, or if they do not create an adequate record
for a appellate court to review their claims.
789 P.2d at 783-84, (Utah 1992).
POINT II.

THE PROSECUTOR MADE IMPROPER AND HARMFUL STATEMENTS IN
HIS CROSS EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT.

The test used for determining whether a prosecutor's
statements are improper and constitute error is whether the
remarks "called to the jurors attention matters which they would
not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." Emmett,
839 P.2d at 785; quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 750, 754
(Utah 1982) .

Reversal is proper where statements are determined

to be harmful. 839 P.2d at 785; (citations omitted).

An error is

harmful if it undermines the reviewing court's confidence in the
verdict, or, stated alternatively, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome without the error, see
17

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993).
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the defendant's right to due
process of law guaranteed by amendments V and XIV of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State
Constitution.

Further, it is the State's burden to show that the

prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
see State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n. 21 (Utah 1986).
A.

The prosecutor did not support his allegations contained in
his cross-examination of Appellant with evidence.
In Appellant's case, the prosecutor failed to support

prejudicial questions with appropriate evidence.

During cross-

examination, the following exchange took place:
Q.

But you did intend to stay in the valley, and continue

working; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But despite that, you immediately left for Washington after

you had had this confrontation in the parking lot; is that
correct?
A.

No.

Q.

You didn't immediately go back to Washington and pawn the

ring and the watch in Seattle, Washington?

Is that what you're

saying here today under oath?
A.

I didn't go back immediately.

Q.

Well, how long did it take you to go back to Washington and

pawn that watch and ring?
A.

I was there approximately a month.

Q.

A month.

And if the pawn records indicated that you had
18

pawned that earlier in Seattle, they would be mistaken?
A.

I can't hear you.

Q.

If the

pawn records from Seattle indicated you had pawned

it earlier than that, they would be mistaken; is that correct?
A.

I believe not.

I did pawn the ring, yes, and the watch.

(R. 410-11); see Addendum D.
The prosecutor did not introduce the pawn records into
evidence.

This series of questions, followed by the State's

failure to present any evidence supporting the allegations
contained in the questions, brought improper information to the
juror's attention.
The Supreme Court of Utah noted in State v. Emmett that this
type of questioning generally constitutes error, see Emmett, 839
P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992).

In Emmett, the prosecutor

repeatedly questioned the defendant whether he had rehearsed his
testimony with his attorney, asking at one point, "He didn't tell
you to face the jury and tell you
786. (emphasis in original).

exactly

what

to say?"

Id. at

The defendant denied the

allegation, and the prosecutor presented no evidence to show that
defense counsel had manufactured defendant's testimony.

The

court noted: "Generally, it is error to ask an accused a question
that implies the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the
prosecution can prove the existence of the fact.

Otherwise, the

only limit on such a line of questioning would be the
prosecutor's imagination." .Id. at 786-87; see also United States
v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (10th Cir. 1984) (requiring
19

prosecutor who asks accused prejudicial fact to prove the fact);
State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)
(holding questioning about prior convictions after witness's
denial improper without extrinsic proof of the convictions).
This issue came before this court in State v. Palmer, 860
P.2d 33 9 (Utah 1993). In Palmer, defendant was charged with
aggravated assault of a child.

The prosecutor asked defendant

several times if he had made incriminating statements to the
victim's stepfather and then did not introduce evidence
demonstrating that assertion.

The court concluded that these

questions which implied inculpatory facts and were unsupported by
evidence were error. 860 P.2d at 343.

The court reserved

analysis on the harmfulness of the error in order to consider it
in conjunction with all of the other errors in the case. Id.
The prosecutor's unsupported questions in the present case
were also error, and were harmful because they affected the
Appellant's character which was central to his defense.

Further,

the unsupported questions demonstrated that Appellant has a
propensity to lie, thereby affecting his credibility, which, like
Appellant's character, was central to his defense of both
charges.
B.

The prosecutor's questions exceeded the scope of crossexamination.
In addition to being unsupported by any evidence, the

prosecutor's questions regarding the pawning of the ring and
watch which are set out above and in Addendum D exceeded the
scope of direct examination.

Utah R. Evid. 611(b) provides:
20

(b)
Scope of cross-examination.
Cross-examination should be
limited to the subject matter of direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the
exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as
if on direct examination.
At no time on direct examination did defense counsel question
Appellant as to what he did with the watch and ring given to him by
Mrs. Davis in part exchange for the ring, nor did Appellant offer
any information on this issue, (R. 375-402).

Because Appellant was

not questioned on direct examination to what he did with the watch
and the ring, and because he volunteered no testimony to that
matter on direct, the prosecutor's questions allowed the jurors to
unjustifiably focus on the fact that Appellant pawned the ring and
the watch.

This error was harmful because it affected Appellant's

credibility and character which, as discussed earlier, were at the
heart of his defense.

This could have reasonably affected the

decision of the jury as to the decision to convict Appellant on the
aggravated assault charge.
C.

The prosecutor asked Appellant to comment on the veracity of
another witness.
In the instant case, the prosecutor asked Appellant whether

he disagreed with the testimony of Mrs. Davis on the issue of the
origin of the ring.
Q.

The questioning was as follows:

So it's your testimony now that you never told anybody on

that occasion that the way you came into possession of this ring
was that it came from your wife, your ex-wife, is that correct?
That's what I'm hearing you say now.
A

I never said it came from my wife.

Q.

Did you ever say it came from your ex-wife?
21

A.

No.

Q.

You heard the testimony, and vou disagree with that

testimony; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

(R. 405, emphasis added); see Addendum D.
In asking Appellant to assess the credibility of Mrs. Davis,
the prosecutor drew to the juror's attention improper
information.
11

The Supreme Court of Utah said in Emmett that

[s] everal courts have noted that it is improper to ask a

criminal defendant to comment on the veracity of another
witness." 839 P.2d at 787; see United States v. Narcisco, 446 F.
Supp. 252, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Commonwealth v. Long, 462
N.E.2d 330, 331-32, review

denied,

465 N.E.2d 262 (1984), People

v. Ellis, 462 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213-214 (1983).

The Emmett court

explained that such a question is improper "because it is
argumentative and seeks information beyond the witness's
competence." 83 9 P.2d at 787; see Narcisco, 446 F.Supp at 321;
Long, 462 N.E.2d at 331-32, Ellis, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14.

The

court said further that "[t]he prejudicial effect of such a
question lies in the fact that it suggests to the jury that a
witness is committing perjury even though there are other
explanations for the inconsistency.

In addition, it puts the

defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the
character and motivations of another witness who may appear
sympathetic to the jury." 839 P.2d at 787; (citations omitted).
In Emmett, the prosecutor asked the defendant if he was
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claiming that his son was lying.

The court found the question

improper but that it was unnecessary to address how the question
affected the trial since the court had previously decided to
reverse for other errors.

The court concluded that "we feel

again compelled to note that prosecutors have a duty to eschew
all improper tactics." 839 P.2d at 787; citing State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 557 (Utah 1987).
The issue was also before this court in State v. Palmer, 860
P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993).

In Palmer, this court relied on

Emmett to find that the prosecution's questions to the defendant
asking him to comment on the veracity of other witnesses amounted
to obvious error. 860 P.2d at 344.

In cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked defendant to comment on the conflict between his
testimony and that of two other witnesses.

Relying on Emmett,

the court found the questions to be argumentative and prejudicial
because such questions suggest to the jury that the witness is
committing perjury even though other explanations may exist for
the inconsistencies. .Id.

The court reserved analysis on the

harmfulness of the error in order to consider it in conjunction
with all of the other errors in the case. Id.
This type of questioning in the instant case was error for
the same reasons as the courts enunciated in both Emmett and
Palmer.

The questions brought improper matters to the juror's

attention.

Further, considered in conjunction with the other

errors of the prosecution, this error was harmful because absent
it, the jury could have reasonably returned with a more favorable
23

result for Appellant.
Review of these issues is proper because they were plain
error. "Plain error is error that is both harmful and obvious."
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; see State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d
155, 158 (Utah 1989) (no obvious error because admission of
evidence part of trial strategy); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819,
821 (Utah 1989)(applying plain error analysis to claims of
prosecutor misconduct); see Utah R. Evid. 103(d).

In Emmett, the

Supreme Court of Utah said it reviews allegation of plain error
despite a timely objection "in order to avoid manifest injustice
and because, if the error is obvious, the trial court has the
opportunity to address the error regardless of the fact that it
was never brought to the court's attention." 839 P.2d at 785,
(citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this g&

day of March, 1994.

)

/ M E T MILLER
/^Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

9 vr

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

CJ.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
AJLR. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.LJL3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *»
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
SJT.IL 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd SJS.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 PM 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
S 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons $ 2.

AX.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 82;
Weapons *» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VH
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

20

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XTV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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76-6-401

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3.
C.J.S. — 77 CJ.S. Robbery § 28.
AJLR. — Fact that gun was unloaded as af-

fecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th
507.
Key Numbers. — Robbery *=> 11.

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and
birds, written instruments or other writings representing or embodying
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility
nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and
that is likley to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impedi160

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

76-6-401

ment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter
of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not
intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-401.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deception.
Purpose to deprive.
Cited.
Deception.
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception" only applies to impressions of fact that
are false at some present time; unfulfilled
promises of future performance do not suffice
as false representations under that subsection.
State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of "deception." the previously created or confirmed
impression of fact must be false when the property is obtained in order to constitute "deception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1983).
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of "deception." a promise of future performance can
constitute deception when the promising party
does not intend to perform or knows the promise will not be performed; a person knows that
a promise will not be performed when he is
aware that the promise is reasonably certain
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1983).

Purpose to deprive.
Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile where defendant drove the automobile in
excess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from
police; told police when stopped that he owned
the automobile; damaged the automobile by
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to California without ever stating he would return the
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d
880 (Utah 1978).
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was inferred from the following facts: in 1984, defendant began borrowing small amounts of money
from the victim to buy pet food; the victim's
generosity prompted defendant to make subsequent requests for larger sums to pay for everything from automobile repairs to medical
bills; with each request, defendant inevitably
promised to repay the victim soon or by a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986, defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid only
about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah's New Penal
Code: theft. 1973 Utah L. Rev. 718.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 1.
CJ.S. — 52A CJ.S. Larceny § 1(1).
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for theft of, interference with, or unauthorized use of, computer programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th
971.

Cat as subject of larceny, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080.
What is "trade secret" so as to render actionable under state law its use or disclosure by
former employee, 59 A.L.R.4th 641.
Key Numbers. — Larceny «=» 1.
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76-6-405. Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means
an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-405.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Distribution of imitation controlled substance.
Elements of offense.
—Pecuniary loss.
Evidence.
Forgery distinguished.
Intent.
Jury instructions.
"Purpose to deprive."
Venue of offense.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section is not unconstitutionally vague
or ambiguous; fact that auto salesman who
knew that turning back an odometer was a
crime assertedly relied upon the fact that former § 41-6-177 made such crime only a misdemeanor did not preclude conviction of the
salesman of theft by deception on basis of his
having turned back the odometer. State v.
Forshee, 588 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
Distribution of imitation controlled substance.
Where defendant distributed an imitation
controlled substance in violation of § 58-37b-4,
pursuant to § 58-37-19, which is applicable to
offenses under Chapter 58-37b, defendant
should have been charged with a violation of
§ 58-37b-4, which specifically proscribed defendant's conduct, rather than with theft by
deception. State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah
1984).
Elements of offense.
For cases discussing elements of former offense of obtaining money by false pretense, see
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527,188 P. 628 (1920);
State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P. 294
(1927); State v. Jensen, 74 Utah 527, 280 P.
1046 (1929); State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38
P.2d 1097 (1934); State v. Timmerman, 88
Utah 481, 55 P.2d 1320 (1936); Ballaine v. District Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 107 Utah

247, 153 P.2d 265 (1944); State v. Vatsis, 10
Utah 2d 244, 351 P.2d 96 (1960); State v.
Nuttall, 16 Utah 2d 171, 397 P.2d 797 (1964).
Reliance by the victim is an element of the
crime of theft by deception; even though the
alleged victim is deceived, if he does not rely on
the deception in parting with his property,
there has been no theft by deception. State v.
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982).
—Pecuniary loss.
Evidence of pecuniary loss can be used to
prove the elements of the crime of theft by deception, although pecuniary loss is not an essential element in itself. State v. Roberts, 711
P.2d 235 (Utah 1985).
Evidence.
Evidence that defendant had signed name of
alleged buyer of automobile to conditional
sales contract which was purchased by finance
company, and that automobile was subsequently sold to third person who paid cash sustained conviction for obtaining money by false
pretenses. State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244, 351
P.2d 96 (1960).
Evidence was not sufficient to support beyond a reasonable doubt finding that buyer
was reasonably certain that his promise to
make a deposit into his checking account
would not be performed, and was therefore insufficient to support his conviction for theft by
deception when his personal check for payment
of the goods was returned for insufficient
funds, where at time buyer gave seller the
check he informed seller of the insufficient
funds in the account; he requested seller not to
cash the check that day; he informed seller
that he had assurances from investors of imminent cash investments which he would deposit
to cover the check; the seller accepted the
check on such terms; and the check was returned for insufficient funds because the buyer
did not receive the expected cash to make the
deposit. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1983).
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Evidence held to be sufficient to establish
the amount of funds embezzled by a theater
manager. See State v. Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104
(Utah 1985).
In a prosecution for theft by deception, there
was sufficient evidence that the defendant,
who sold a mobile home under a lease-back arrangement, then secured two loans using the
same mobile home as collateral, without disclosing that title was encumbered, intended to
deceive at the time of the transactions. State v.
Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985).
Forgery distinguished.
Court properly ordered release of defendant
who had pleaded guilty to crime of obtaining
money or property by false pretenses, when information charged him with crime of forgery;
former crime was not "necessarily included" in
crime of forgery, although both crimes included elements of fraud; forgery had to do
with alteration or falsification of written instruments or documents, or use of unauthorized signatures, while false pretenses statute
applied to wide range of activities related to
property which might have in some instances
involved forgery, but usually did not. Williams
v. Turner, 421 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1970).
Intent
In a prosecution for theft by deception, the
intent of the defendant at the time of taking
the victim's money is determinative, and the
fact that the defendant later enters an agreement with the victim, appearing to negate any
criminal intent, is immaterial. State v.
Droddy, 702 P.2d 111 (Utah 1985).
Jury instructions.
Instructions referred to the intent required
for commission of the offense but that did not
inform the jury that before returning a verdict

of guilty they must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant had the conscious objective to withhold the property permanently was
fatally defective. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33
(Utah 1980).
Where defendant was charged with theft by
deception, instruction to jury stating that they
"may" employ a presumption that "the law presumes that a person intends the reasonable
and ordinary consequences of his own act" violated defendant's constitutional right to due
process of law because under the instruction
given, the burden of persuasion on the element
of intent, in the jury's mind, may have been
shifted to the defendant. State v. Walton, 646
P.2d 689 (Utah 1982).
"Purpose to deprive."
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was inferred from the following facts: in 1984, the
defendant began borrowing small amounts of
money from the victim to buy pet food; the victim's generosity prompted defendant to make
subsequent requests for larger sums to pay for
everything from automobile repairs to medical
bills; with each request, defendant inevitably
promised to repay the victim soon or by a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986, defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid only
about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Venue of offense.
District court had jurisdiction of offense of
obtaining money by false pretense where both
mispresentation and delivery of goods were accomplished in Utah. State v. Cobb, 13 Utah 2d
376, 374 P.2d 844 (1962).
Cited in State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959 (Ct.
App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Criminal and Civil
Liability for Bad Checks in Utah, 1970 Utah L.
Rev. 122.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pretenses § 1.
C.J.S. — 35 C J.S. False Pretenses § 5.
AX.R. — Attempts to commit offenses of
larceny by trick, confidence game, false pretenses, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 241.
Criminal liability of corporation for extor-

tion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 49
A.L.R.3d 820.
Criminal liability in connection with application for, or receipt of, public relief or welfare
payments, 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.
Key Numbers. — False Pretenses «=• 2.
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Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
Cross-References. — Arraignment, necessity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10.

Indictments and informations,
errors, U.R.CrJP. 4.

harmless

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admission of photographic evidence.
Clerical mistakes.
—Defendant's right of allocution.
Harmless error.
Minor defect.
Substantial right affected.
—State's burden of persuasion.
Variances.
Cited.
Admission of photographic evidence.
Even though admission of photographs of
manslaughter victim served only to create
emotional impact on jury, their admission was
not reversible error, they were not so gruesome
or offensive that their absence would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for defendant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979).
Clerical mistakes.
—Defendant's right of allocution.
The defendant's due process right of allocution was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held
in his presence, where he was addressed by the
judge and elected to speak, and an amended
judgment subsequently entered by the trial
court, at which the defendant was not present
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence.
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988).
Harmless error.
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge
of female under age of 18 years, although it
was error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts
of sexual intercourse after one relied on for
conviction, such error was not prejudicial to
defendant so as to require reversal. State v.
Mattivi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911).
Where defendant in murder prosecution contested every step taken by state during
progress of trial and was afforded every opportunity to defend charge, and his counsel insisted upon every right to which the law entitled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not
guilty was received on legal holiday did not
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918).
In a prosecution of a state fish and game
warden for appropriating state money to his
own use, an instruction in which the court read
the entire statute on misuse of public money
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded.
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968
(1922).
The admission of testimony at trial in viola*-*— -r j _ r — J „ „ « . ' „ A«««jtiHitiftnol mnfrnn tat inn

rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
where such testimony was merely cumulative.
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982).
Trial court's instruction that flight from
scene of crime of aggravated burglary
amounted to implied admission of guilt was erroneous, but was not prejudicial, since there
was other evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah
1983).
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional
right not to take the stand did not require reversal where the other evidence of guilt was
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections
prevented the prosecutor from making any real
point of the failure to testify, and the judge's
quick and decisive admonition to the jury and
prosecutor further obviated any harm that
might have resulted from the comments. State
v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985).
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an
insurer in the information as comprising an
element of aggravated arson was harmless
error, where a correct instruction on the subject was later given to the jury immediately
before their deliberations, to which no objection was taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d
510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Admission of defendant's prior offenses was
harmless error as there was no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result without the
admission of the prior bad acts evidence. State
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989).
Minor defect
Conviction for fornication would not be reversed because information charged defendant
with having committed offense with one
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, where
identity of woman was sufficiently established.
State v. Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P. 89
(1912).
Substantial right affected.
Court could not reverse judgment unless
some substantial right of defendant had been
invaded. State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P.
271 (1918).
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on
appeal merely because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will be overturned
only if the error or irregularity is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.
State v. Hutchinson. 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982);
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989);
State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).
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material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some perjog
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that WknJ
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the per
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connectedi
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or*
specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to sep
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their &_
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselvet'tj
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that'it'ts
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instnip
tions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received Sf
evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any iiqGSt
of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by an^
other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept IJK
gether in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Ex~
cept by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall nol
fcllow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except tcr
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before theverdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations!
or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise
the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry
and the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out
again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
Cross-References. — Capital felony, penalty, execution of penalty, §§ 76-3-206,
76-3-207, 77-19-1 et seq.
Fees, payment by state in criminal cases,
§ 21-6-5.
Husband and wife as witness for or against
each other, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12;
§§ 77-1-6, 78-24-8.

Jurors and jury, § 78-46-1 et seq.
Report of testimony of witness taken at preliminary examination as admissible, Rule 7.
Right to jury trial, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec.
10, § 77-1-6.
When judgment rendered, Rule 22.
When verdict rendered, Rule 21

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

111, disabled, or disqualified jurors.
—Agreement to proceed
—Challenges to new juror.
—Continuance.
Jury deliberations.
—Deadlock juries.

Discharge.
Instruction.
—Outside communications.
—Physical evidence
—Requests for further instructions.
Absence of counsel.
Absence of defendant.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
RULE

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Scope.
Purpose and construction.
Rulings on evidence.
Preliminary questions.
Limited admissibility.
Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS.

301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and
proceedings.
302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.

401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
405. Methods of proving character.
406. Habit; routine practice.
407. Subsequent remedial measures.
408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
409. Payment of medical and similar expenses.
410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and
related statements.
411. Liability insurance.
412. [Reserved.]
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES.

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

Privileges recognized.
Husband-wife.
Communications to clergy.
Lawyer-client.
Government informer.
Physician and psychotherapist-patient.
Miscellaneous matters.
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES.

601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.

General rule of competency.
Lack of personal knowledge.
Oath or affirmation.
Interpreters.
Competency of judge as witness.
Competency of juror as witness.
Who may impeach.
Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
Religious beliefs or opinions.
Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
Writing used to refresh memory.
Prior statements of witnesses.
Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court.
Exclusion of witnesses.
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702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.

Testimony by experts.
Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
Opinion on ultimate issue.
Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert
opinion.
Court-appointed experts.
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY.
Definitions.
Hearsay rule.
Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant
immaterial.
Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
Hearsay within hearsay.
Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION.

901. Requirement of authentication or identification.
902. Self-authentication.
903. Subscribing witness* testimony unnecessary.
ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS,
RECORDINGS, AND
PHOTOGRAPHS.

1001.
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.
1006.
1007.
1008.

Definitions.
Requirement of original.
Admissibility of duplicates.
Admissibility of other evidence of contents.
Public records.
Summaries.
Testimony or written admission of party.
Functions of court and jury.
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES.

1101. Applicability of rules.
1102. [Reserved.]
1103. Title.
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Rule 101. Scope.
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this
State, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in
Rule 1101.
Rule 102. Purpose and construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development
of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
afifected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was

—~~^*** vi wicr ooa ruung. The court may
w
add any other or further statement which shows the
character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It
may direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested
to the jury by any means, such as making statements
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of
the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Rule 104. Preliminary questions.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests
of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and
so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not,
by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or
recorded statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party
may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice
has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed.
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS.
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings.
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not
otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence
of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither
presumption applies.
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a
claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS
LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.

ARTICLE n. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in
courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.

Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or

notice of
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(1922) (referred to in Committee
Green, 578 P.2d 512 (Utah
B v Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah
* v Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah
B v

Note);
1978);
1979);
1986);

Rule 611

State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
L§w. 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
Green v. Bock Laundry — Federal Rule
609<a)<l) in Civil Cases: The Supreme Court
Takes an Imbalanced Approach, 1990 Utah L.
R*v. 613.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses
f 569 et seq.
CJ.S. — 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507.
A.L.R. — Permissibility of impeaching cred-

ibility of witness by showing former conviction
as affected by pendency of appeal from conviction or motion for new trial, 16 A.L.R.3d 726.
Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in civil case by showing former conviction,
of questions relating to nature and extent of
punishment, 67 A.L.R.3d 761.
Right to impeach credibility of accused by
showing prior conviction as affected by remoteness in time of prior offense, 67 A.L.R.3d 824.
Key Numbers. — Witnesses •» 345.

Rule 610. Religious beliefs or opinions.
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not
admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the
witness* credibility is impaired or enhanced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
Che federal rule, verbatim, and is in accord
with Rule 20 [Rule 30], Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Cross-References. — Religious belief not

basis of incompetency as a witness, Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
(a) Control by court The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness'
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and restates the inherent power of the court to control the judicial
Process. Cf. Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d
210. 461 P.2d 56 (1969). There was no compatible provision to Subsection (b) in Utah Rules
tf Evidence (1971), but it is comparable to current Utah case law and practice. Degnan, Non-

Rules Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6
Utah L. Rev. 323 (1959). Subsection (c) is comparable to current Utah practice. Cf. Rule
43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cross-examination.
Exclusion of witnesses.
Leading questions.
Cross-examination.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in

control of cross-examination by defense counsel. See Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210,
461 P.2d 56 (1969).
The latitude that may be allowed in crossexamination is largely within the discretion of
the trial court, to be exercised and governed by
the facts and circumstances of each particular

ADDENDUM B

II

you want to step back and hand them to the baliffs at the

21

front door, feel free to do so.

3J

write your name at the bottom, and indicate you were a

4J

juror so I know who they came from.

51

they are administratively dismissed.

6 1

else I'm going to dismiss the jury at this time.

If you do mail them in,

And then I can see
If there's nothing

7

MS. REMAL:

Nothing else.

8 1

THE COURT:

Thank you all very much, ladies

9 1
101

and gentlemen.

Please have a nice day.

MR. MORGAN:

Your Honor, before we proceed

111

with your ruling, perhaps I may be able to save that

12 1

judicial time.

13 J

One moment.

THE COURT:

I suppose the reason I took this

14I

under advisement as to count one was my concern at the

15 I

time that —

16 1

hook, and they didn f t.

17 I

more to weight than actually being able to determine as a

18 J

matter of law that reasonable minds could not differ on

19 1

the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.

20I

I still have concerns about the strength of the State's

211

case primarily on the basis of intent as far as Mr.

22 1

Taylor's concerned, I in all honesty do not feel that I

23I

would be acting appropriately if I said that as a matter

24 J

of law, reasonable minds could not differ with regard to

25 1

the question of intent.

I thought the jury would let me off the
I think my concern went perhaps

And while

I believe it's possible that
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II

reasonable minds can differ, and I think it's a question

2I

of proof in my own view of the evidence in particularly

31

the state of mind of Mr. Taylor when he first went in

41

Fankhauser Jewelry, and I suppose thatfs basis upon the

51

after events, but those are traditionally matters for a

61

trier of fact, and not a matter for the Court to rule on

7I

as a matter of law.

8J

some serious concerns about the strength of the State • s

91

case, I'm not willing to say as a matter of law that it

So while I then and still do have

10 1

must fail.

Therefore, the motion is denied.

All right.

Ill

Having granted a mistrial in this matter, what I am going

12 1

to do is this:

13 J

proceed to sentence on the third degree felony?

Is there any reason I ought not to

14 1

MR. MORGAN:

15 1

MR. REMAL:

None that I know, Your Honor.

16 1

THE COURT:

Let's set the matter down for

17 1

sentencing.

No reason known to the State.

October 29th, Evelyn?

18

THE CLERK:

19 1

THE COURT:

Yes.
Mr. Taylor, you have a right to

20 1

be sentenced not earlier than two, no more than thirty

211

days from today1s date.

22I

appropriate to get a pre-sentence report?

Ms. Remal, would it be

23

MR. REMAL:

I believe it would be.

24

THE COURT:

I111 set the matter for the 29th

25 1

of October at nine ofclock for sentencing.

I111 refer
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2J
2J

3I

w o r k , a n d h e needed m o n e y .
Q.

S o h e indicated h e w a s f a m i l i a r w i t h t h a t

particular

—

4

A.

Y e s . H e said it b e l o n g e d t o h i s w i f e .

5I

Q.

D i d h e s a y a n y t h i n g e l s e about t h e o r i g i n o f

6I

that diamond?

7J

A.

8|

Q.

9 J
10 I

No.
Now, y o u indicated that y o u t e s t e d it w i t h a

diamond tester.

Y o u ' v e been kind e n o u g h t o b r i n g t h a t

diamond tester today?

Ill

A.

Yes.

12i

Q.

Would you take it out of your little bag

13
14I
15

there?
A.

Yes.
MR. MORGAN:

May we show that to the jury?

16

don't think we want to enter it into evidence.

17I

for demonstrative purposes.

Use it

18

T H E COURT:

Defendant have any objection?

19 1

MS. REMAL:

I don't have any objection, as

20

long as Mr. Taylor and I can move so we can see the

21J

demonstration.

22 1
23 1
24
25

THE WITNESS:

I

It's b l i n k i n g now, a n d o n c e it

stops and says ready, then it's ready to be used.
M R . MORGAN:

M i n d if w e s h o w it t o c o u n s e l

and the jury?
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THE WITNESS:

21

THE COURT:

3I

MR. MORGAN:

I'd just like to show it to the

THE COURT:

Pass it around, let them take a

jury.

6J
7

look at it.

8

Q.

9|

Mr. Taylor, just stand right back

there by your counsel.

4
5

No, that's fine

(By Mr. Morgan)

light is blinking right now.

You indicated that the
What does that mean?

10I

A.

That it's getting ready.

11

Q.

We just heard a beep.

12

A:

Did you touch your diamond?.

13 1

Q.

I donft have a diamond.

14|

A.

Oh, the beep meant that it was ready.

15
16 1
17 J

it just —
Q.

It's heating up.

What does that mean?

Isn't

not blinking any more?
And the red light will stay on when it's

ready to test?

18I

A.

Yes.

Until you touch something with it.

19

Q.

Based upon your training and experience,

20 1

you've indicated that you do have a diamond on your hand;

211

is that correct?

22 1

A.

Yes. Uh huh (affirmative).

23

Q.

What size of diamond is that?

24

A.

2.11 karats.

25

Q.

That's a big one?

Page 20
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

00290

1

A.

Uh huh (affirmative)•

2

Q.

Would you test for the jury to show them what

3J

it sounds like?

4I
51

Now, I'll give you your diamond back.

THE COURT:

Mr. Taylor, stand back over here

behind your attorney, please.

61

Q.

(By Mr. Morgan)

Now, we just heard a beep?

7

A.

The green light comes on and says diamond.

8

Q.

What does that mean?

91

A.

That it is a diamond.

10 1

Q.

Now, we're going to have to allow it to

111

recharge again, and that will turn red again, and you111

12 1

hear a little beep, and you1re now going to test the item

13 I

that was represented as a diamond by the defendant; is

14 J

that correct?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

State's Exhibit 1?

171

A.

I can touch mine again.

18 1

Q.

Now you're touching your's again?

19

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

20 1

Q.

And it's beeping and turning green?

211

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

22 J

Q.

It did not beep or turn green on the

23 1

defendant's; is that right?

24

A.

No.

25 1

Q.

This is the kind of test you conducted?
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I)

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

You checked it twice?

3

A.

Yes.

4J

Q.

You realize now it was not a diamond.

And

5J

based upon its color, and its size, you concluded it was

6

a cubic zirconium?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

The defendant returned later that day?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And who was present at that time?

Ill

A.

My daughter Linda, myself, and my husband,

12
13
14
15

He came back about 1:30.

Gary.
Q.

And did the defendant approach you again at

that time?
A.

Yes.

He came in, and said that the hands on

16

the watch were not lined up.

17 1

o'clock, both hands should be on top of each other, the

18 1

hour hand was off so that —

19 1

but I know what he meant.

20 J

o'clock, maybe the hour hand was on 1, between 1 and 12,

21j

to indicate that the hands weren't lined up.

22
23 J

Q.

In other words, at twelve

he didn't say how far off,

Instead of being twelve

And at that time, did you confront him with

your discovery that it was a cubic zirconium?

24 1

A.

Yes. My daughter, Linda, told

25 1

Q.

Did you confront him?

—

Page 22
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

ADDENDUM D

11

zirconium or a real diamond?

2I

A.

No, I did not.

31

Q.

Did you at any time on June 21st, 1993 try to

4J
51

hit Linda Davis with your car?
A.

61
71

No.
MS. REMAL:

questions, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

9
10 1
111
12 1
13I
14I

I don't have anything further

Mr. Morgan?

CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Morgan:
Q.

You testified that you found this in a dryer

two days before the incident; is that correct?
A.

It was not in a dryer; it was in a washing

machine.

15

Q.

You found it two days prior; is that correct?

16 I

A.

No.

17

Q.

You found it?

18 I

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Before you are took it into the jewelry

20 1
211
22 J
23
24 J
25

It was on Sunday morning.

store?
A.

I found it Sunday morning after I took my

wash out of the machine.
Q.

Do you understand what I'm asking you?

Did

you find it two days before?
A.

No.
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Q.

Did you find it before you went into the

jewelry store?

Yes or no?

A.

Yes.

Q.

It was not your property; is that correct?

A.

No, it wasn't.

Q.

This is somebody elsefs property, no matter

what it is, when you walked into the jewelry store; isn't
that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

When you went in there, you sold

it as if it were your own; is that correct?
A.

I wanted to find out if it was real first.

Q.

I understand.

My question, however, was when

you made the transaction, you sold it, and represented to
them that this was your own; isn't that correct?

No

matter what it was?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you misrepresented by your own testimony

where you got this ring and who owned it?
A.

Can you define that a little bit for me?

Q.

Yes.

To misrepresent means to lie.

You lied

to them about whether or not you owned this ring or not,
didn't you?
A.

I made no statement to them.

I brought it in

to have it appraised.
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ll
2I

Q.

It was a lie when you sold this ring to them

as your own, wasn•t it?

31

A.

I don't think it was quite a lie.

41

Q.

What do you think it quite was?

5I

A.

I think what I should have done was do some

6I
7 I

more research.
Q.

When you walked in there, and you

8I

misrepresented that it was your own property, you told

9I

them that it belonged to your wife, or your ex-wife;

10

isn't that true?

Ill

A.

I never said I had a wife.

12

Q.

You didn't?

13

A.

No, I didn't.

14 1

Q.

You are divorced, aren't you?

15

A.

Say what?

16 J

Q.

You're divorced, aren't you?

17

A.

Yes.

18 I

Q.

And you were divorced on June 21st, 1993,

19 1

weren't you?

201

A.

Yes.

211

Q.

So you did have an ex-wife?

22

A.

Yes.

23 1

Q.

And so it's very reasonable to assume that

24 I

you did tell them that this belonged to your ex-wife; is

25

that correct.

Page
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ll
2I

M S . REMAL:
question.

I object to the form of the

I think he can ask what he did or didn't say.

31

MR. MORGAN:

I withdraw the question.

4

THE COURT:

Very well.

51

Q.

(By Mr. Morgan)

So it's your testimony now

6 J

that you never told anybody on that occasion that the way

7J

you came into possession of this ring was that it came

8l

from your wife, your ex-wife; is that correct?

9

what I'm hearing you say you now.

That's

10 I

A.

I never said it came from my wife.

Ill

Q.

Did you ever say it came from your ex-wife?

12

A.

No.

13 J

Q.

You heard the testimony, and you disagree

14 J

with that testimony; is that correct?

15

A.

Yes.

16 I

Q.

Nobody ever asked you where you got the ring?

17 1

A.

Yes, she did.

18 1

Q.

And how did you respond when you were asked?

19|

A.

I didn't respond.

20 1
2ll

THE COURT:
Q.

He said he didn't respond.

You didn't respond.

They didn't ask you

—

22 1

when you didn't respond to them asking you where you got

23

the ring, did that surprise you?

24 I
25i

A.

M s . Davis was making the assumption that it

was my ex-wife's.
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1

Q.

Why would she make that assumption?

21

A.

Possibly because it's a woman's ring.

3i

Q.

Were you wearing a wedding ring?

4

A.

No.

51

Q.

Are you wearing a wedding ring today?

6

A.

No.

71

Q.

So why would one assume that it came from

81

someone to whom you've been married?

91

A.

I don't know.

10 I

Q.

That would not be a reasonable assumption in

111
12 I
13 I

your opinion, would it?
A.
sorry.

Could you —

I can't hear very well.

I'm

Could you come up closer?

14 1

Q.

15 1

to get.

16 I

You indicated that you believed that Mrs. Davis, Miriam

17 1

Davis assumed this came from your ex-wife; is that

18I

correct?

19I

Or your wife?

20 1

A.

That's what she said, yes.

21

Q.

When did she say that?

22

A.

After I asked her if she'd appraise it.

23

Q.

So she said this came from your ex-wife, and

24 J
25

You indicated —

this is as close as I want

If you can't hear me, I'll repeat the question.

again, did you respond to that statement?
A.

I didn't really say anything, no.
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1

Q.

Didnft it surprise you that she never

2

questioned your failing to tell her where the ring came

3

from?

4I

MR. REMAL:

Your Honor, I object.

I don't

5I

think it • s relevant whether it surprised him or not what

6

Ms. Davis was thinking.

71
8
9J
10I
Ill
12 J
13 J
14 J

THE COURT:
Q.

Overruled.

(By Mr. Morgan)

Did it surprise you that

she did not question your failure to tell her where this
ring came from?
A.

To be honest with you, she was more eager to

find out if the ring was real or not.
Q.

And you were willing to let her just take the

ring no matter what; is that correct?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Were you eager to sell this ring?

17 1

A*

I wanted to find out its true value, yes.

18 I

Q.

Were you eager to sell the ring?

19 1

A.

Not necessarily, no.

20 I

Q.

Were you employed on June 21st, 1993 in the

21

State of Utah?

22

A.

Yes.

23 1

Q.

What were you doing for a living?

24 1

A.

Working.

25 1

Q.

Where were you working?
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II

A.

Subcontractor•

21

Q.

For whom were you subcontracting?

31

A.

His name is Cal.

4I

I was working up in Park

City at the time.

51

Q.

What's Cal's last name?

6J

A.

To be honest with you, Ifd have to get the

71

phonebook and get it out for you.

8J

one week.

91
10I

Q.

I worked for him for

And during that one week period, how much did

you earn?

11

A.

About $150.00.

12 1

Q.

With that $150.00 over the one week period,

13 I

did you have any money in your pocket when you walked in

14

there?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

How much money did you have in your pocket?

17

A.

I had several hundred dollars.

18
19 1
20
2l|
22 1
23 I
24 J
25 I

Can we back

up a little bit?
Q.

Sure.

You're about to tell me where you got

the several hundred dollars from.
A.

I was working for Intermountain Temporary.

I

had been working for them for over a year.
Q.

Those are for people who don't have continued

employment; is that correct?
A.

I don't work for them any more, no.
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1
2J

Q.

Maybe I didn't make that clear.

You didn't

have a regular job, did you?

3j

A.

I was working through a temporary service,

51

Q.

And that is not a regular job, is it?

61

A.

It's work.

7J

Q.

Needed money, didn't you?

8I

A.

No.

91

Q.

You were eager to sell this ring because you

4

10 J
11

yes.

needed money?
A.

Can we back up a little bit?

12 1

THE COURT:

No.

14 1

MR. MORGAN:

It was a question, Your Honor. I

15 I

think it's best just to move on.

13

16 1
17I

Is that a question, or a

statement?

Q.

(By Mr. Morgan)

Now, when was the last

time you got paid?

181

A.

Friday.

19 1

Q.

Did you expect to go to work the following

20 1

Monday?

21
22 J

A.
semi trucks.

23

Q.

24

trucks?

251

I also worked during the weekends detailing

A.

I see.

For whom did you work detailing semi

Just independent owners.
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11
2J

Q.

And you would have to look in the phone book

to find their names as well?

3J

A.

No, I'd go to the truckstops.

41

Q.

And did you expect to work that week?

51

A.

It was — yes.

61

Q.

And you expected to continue working in

7

construction as a subcontractor up in Park City as well;

8J

is that correct?

9
10 1

A.
week.

I worked up there with this person for one

That was the term of the job. Yes.

Ill

Q.

So that job was over?

12

A.

Yes.

13 I

Q.

But you did intend to stay in the valley, and

14 J

continue working; is that correct?

15

A,

Yes.

16 1

Q.

But despite that, you immediately left for

17 I

Washington after you had had this confrontation in the

18

parking lot; is that correct?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

You didn't immediately go back to Washington

21

and pawn the ring and the watch in Seattle, Washington?

22 I

Is that what you're saying here today under oath?

23 1

A.

I didn't go back immediately.

24 I

Q.

Well, how long did it take you to go back to

25

Washington and pawn that watch and ring?
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1

A.

I was there approximately a month.

2

Q.

A month.

And if the pawn records indicated

3

that you had pawned that earlier in Seattle, they would

4

be mistaken?

5

A.

I can't hear you.

6

Q.

If the pawn records from Seattle indicated

I

7

you had pawned it earlier than that, they would be

1

8

mistaken; is that correct?

I

9
10
11
12 j

A.

I believe not.

I did pawn the ring, yes, and

I

the watch •
Q.

1

You had another ring with you at the time

J

that you 'went into the jewelry store?

J

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Where did you get this ring?

J

15

A.

It was given to me by my mother.

1

16

Q.

It was given to you by the —

J

17

A.

Mother.

J

18

Q.

The mother of whom?

1

19

A.

Me.

20

Q.

Your mother?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And that ring is where today?

J

23

A.

It's back in Washington.

1

24

Q.

Where in Washington?

1

25

A.

It should be in my car if it's still there.

I

1
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1

Q.

You never pawned that ring?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

You have never tried to sell that ring?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

But you had that appraised?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

If you weren't going to sell it, why did you

8
9

have that ring appraised?

A.

It had some sentimental value to me.
My mother —

I

10

wanted to know.

she gave my brother a ring

11

too, which is worth, I don't know, probably right around

12

$3,000.

13

longer.

14

Q.

She's probably not going to be around much

The stones that were in that ring, it's your

15

testimony that Mrs. Davis told you that they were

16

zircons?

17

A.

18
19

(Witness nods affirmatively).
THE COURT:

You need to answer audibly.

You

need to say yes or no, sir.

20

Q.

(By Mr. Morgan)

Was that a yes?

21

A.

I —

22

Q.

Did Mrs. Davis tell you that the stones in

23

the ring that you've identified as coming from your

24

mother, that they were zircons?

25

A.

Is that your testimony?

Yes.
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1

Q.

That's what you told them?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And she looked at those under a glass to

4

determine whether or not they were zircons?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And you indicated that your brother has a

7

similar ring that you believe is worth $3,000; is that

8

correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Now, you had never heard of zircons until

11

after this incident?

12

A.

I've seen them on TV before,

yes.

13

Q.

Now, when you were told that the stones in

14

the smaller ring were zircons, then what did you

15

understand the value of that ring to be?

16

A.

17

fifty —

18

Q.

She told me it was worth, I don't know, maybe
$60.00.
And that would be considerably less than the

19

value of a similar ring belonging to your brother would

20

be; is that correct?

21
22
23

A.

The ring my brother has that my mother gave

to him has two rubies in it, and I think four diamonds.
Q.

And so you did understant the difference of

24

the value between a Zircon and a diamond at that time,

25

didn't you?

Page 143
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

0f4ir

1

A.

I didn't know if it was real or not.

21

Q.

And you didn f t know this ring was real or not

31

at that time; isn't that correct?

4I

A.

Yes.

51

Q.

You did know, or you didn't know?

6|

A.

I didn't know.

7 1

Q.

And you went in there because you did not

8 1

know the ring was real or not, and that's why you wanted

9 J

it appraised, isn't that what you testified to?

10 1
111
12 J

A.

I wanted to find out if it was real or not,

Q.

So you did not know at the time that the ring

yes.

13I

was real or not when you asked to have it appraised is

14

your version?

15

A.

No.

16 1

Q.

Therefore, if you represented that it was a

17 1
18
19j
20 I

diamond, that would not be the truth?
A.

I thought if somebody was going to give that

much merchandise, that it must have been real.
Q.

Under your version, it is Mrs. Davis who

211

suggested that it was a diamond, and not you; is that

22 J

correct?

23|

A.

I said —

24 J

Q.

You never represented that it was a diamond

25 I

as far as I knew, it was.

when you initially made the trade?

That is that your
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11

testimony?

21

A.

As far as I knew, it was.

31

Q.

Do you know what the word represent means?

4I

A.

51

Q.

6

Yes.
Did you ever represent at the time the

transaction was made that this was a diamond?

7

A.

Yes.

8 1

Q.

So you did tell them that it was a diamond

9I

even though you did not know?

10 I
111

A.
her, yes.

12 J

Q.

After I went through the transaction with
As far as I knew, I believed it was.
So when you came back later that day, and you

13 J

kept insisting it was a diamond, what had changed your

14

mind?

15 J
16 1
17 1

A.

When you —

could you speak towards me?

Ifm

having a real hard time hearing.
Q.

I f ll speak louder.

When you returned to the

18 J

store later that day, and you insisted that it was a

19 J

diamond, what had changed your mind?

20 1

A.

I don f t quite understand you.

211

Q.

Let's break it down into pieces.

Did you

22I

return later that day to get the hands on the watch

23 J

fixed, or to get the watch fixed?

24I

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

When you returned, did they tell you that it
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11

was a cubic zirconium?

21

A.

Yes.

31

Q.

Did you nonetheless insist that it was a

4J

diamond?

51

A.

I believed it was, yes.

61

Q.

Did you tell them that it was a diamond?

71

A.

I may have, yes.

8

Q.

Don•t you remember?

91

A.

I may have, yes.

10 1

Q.

Do you remember telling them that it was a

11J

diamond at that time?

12 J
13 J

A.

Q.

18 1
19 J

I understand.

Did you tell them that it was

a diamond?

16 J
17I

I was still going on the basics

what I learned before.

14 1
15I

After she —

A.

I donft —

Q.

Yes.

explain to me.

Can you break it

down?
Did you tell Mrs. Davis that it was a

diamond?

20I

A.

I may have, yes.

21J

Q.

When you say you may have, does that mean you

22 1

don't remember?

23

A.

I may have, yes. Yeah.

24 I

Q.

Do you remember telling them it was a

25I

diamond?
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11

A.

21

Q.

Yes.
Thank you.

So you did tell them it was a

3

diamond?

4

diamond, or you didn't know?

When you walked in, you didn't think it was a

5

A.

I didn't know if it was or not.

6

Q.

What changed between the time that you let

7

them tell you it was a diamond, and when you went in and

8

told them it was a diamond?

9

A.

Can you break this down for me?

10

Q.

Did anything change between the time that you

11

left and when you came back that caused you to believe

12

that it was a diamond?

13

A.

As far as I knew, I felt it was.

14

Q.

You had your Washington ID with you when you

15

came to Utah?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

But you weren't in Utah for very long; is

18

that correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Did you get a Utah driver's license?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Showing you what's been marked as State's

I have been.

23 1

Exhibit 9, does that appear to be the record of your

24

driver's license in Washington?

25 1

A.

Yes.
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21

Q.

That's the information that you have on your

driver's license card; is that correct?

3I

A.

Yes.

41

Q.

Is that your picture as it appeared on June

5

21st, 1993?

6

A.

Yes.

71

Q.

That is your signature?

8

A.

Yes.

91

Q.

That is your identification number as well;

10 J

is that correct?

11

A.

Yes.

12 1

Q.'

Now, did you have any other identification

13 J

with you at that time?

14

A.

Yes.

15 1

Q.

What other identification did you have?

16 1

A.

Several bank cards, social security card,

17j
18 1
19 1

veteran's card, and a check cashing card.
Q.

All of those forms of identification are in

the name of Dale Taylor; is that correct?

20 1

A.

Yes.

211

Q.

When she offered to give you a check in

22 J

exchange for this ring, she asked you your name?

23

A.

Yes.

24 1

Q.

And you gave her the name Dale Taylor?

25

A.

Yes, I did.
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1
2

Q*

If you had given her any other name, could

you have cashed that check?

3

A.

No.

4I

Q.

Do you remember the instructions from Mrs.

5J

Davis telling you that there would not be money in the

6J

account until tomorrow; is that correct?

71
8I

A.

She said that she had to make a deposit later

that afternoon, or the next morning.

91

Q.

And she asked you to wait; is that correct?

10

A.

Yes.

Ill

Q.

But you didn't wait, did you?

12

A.

No, I didnft.

13 I

Q.

Why didn't you wait?

14 1

A.

I wanted to see if the check was good.

15 1

Q.

Once you found out the check was good, and

16 1
17 I
18 1
19 1

there was money in the account, why didnft you wait?
A.

If it would have been post-dated, I would

have.
Q.

Did you think it might inconvenience her to

20 1

have her checks bouncing because you took the check out

211

before she said that you could?

22j

A.

I did not force this woman to write a check.

23 I

Q.

Now, you forced her to give you a ring, and

24 I

you forced her to give you a watch in return for your

25 1

representation that this is a diamond, when you knew that
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II

it was a Zircon; isn't that correct.

2
31

MR. REMAL:
of the question.

41

Your Honor, I object to the form

There's no evidence of forcing her.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

51

Q.

6J

things?

71

A.

I did not force this woman to do anything.

81

Q.

You didn't use physical force?

91

A.

No.

10 J

Q.

You used deception, didn't you?

11

A.

No.

12 1

Q.

You didn't ask for a receipt, did you?

13 1

A.

I figured I should have been given one, yes.

14 J

Q.

Did you ask for one?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Why not?

17 J

A.

I don't know.

18 1
19 1
20 1
211

(By Mr. Morgan)

You caused her to do those

I figured this was just

business practice.
Q.

It's good business practice to not ask for a

receipt?
A.

22 1

materials.

23 J

receipt.

She was the one that was giving me the
It was her responsibility to give me the

24 I

Q.

And you did not ask for one?

25 1

A.

I didn't even think of it at the time.
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2

Q.

something else other than that; wouldnft you agree?

3I
41

A.

To be honest with you, I didn't see any

injuries on this woman at that time.

51
6

She must have gotten those injuries from

Q.

So those injuries must have come from

something other than the confrontation with you?

7

A.

I don't know.

81

Q.

Did those injuries come from the

9I

confrontation with you or not?

10 J

MR. REMAL:

Your Honor, I think he's asking

THE COURT:

Sustained.

11

for —

12
13

know.

14
15 1
16

He said, I don't

THE WITNESS:

To be honest with you, I

didn't see any injuries on her at that time.
Q.

(By Mr. Morgan)

You indicated that you

17 J

believed that Mrs. Davis had switched the stones on you.

18 I

Do you recall that when you testified on direct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What led you to believe that she had switched

211
22 1

the stones on you?
A.

It just didn't make sense to me that somebody

23 J

would give this type of merchandise, and then come back

24

three hours later, and say it was not real without

25 I

testing it fully.
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1

Q.

So it's her fault she didn't test it?

2

A.

If all this would have been tested and done

3

the proper way, none of this would have actually ever

4

happened.

5

Q.

You've never returned the diamond ring?

6

A.

I would have taken it to the police, yes.

7

Q.

You never returned the watch?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

You never returned the $1,275.00; is that

10

correct?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

And you believe you're entitled to that?

13

A.

It seems like there's a big misunderstanding

14
15

in the whole deal.
Q.

There was a misunderstanding at the point

16

where you returned, and they said, let's talk about this,

17

wasn't there, sir?

18

A.

I didn't know what to think at the time.

19

Q.

So you did not understand —

in your mind,

20

they did not understand, and that's pretty much a

21

misunderstanding; is it not?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Now, when you left, why didn't you just wait

24
25

for the police, or call the police yourself?
A.

I don't know.
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l|
2I

Q.

Didn f t you testify that you believed they had

switched the ring?

3

A.

Yes.

4 1

Q.

If somebody had switched a $3,000 diamond

5

ring, don't you think that's a fraud?

6

A.

Yes.

7 1

Q.

That's a crime, because somebody deceived

8 1

you, if that had taken place; isn't that correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10 J

Q.

If somebody had taken a ring, and said that

11J

it was a diamond to cheat you out of the —

if somebody

12 J

had taken the ring, and said it was a zirconium to cheat

13 J

you out of your rightful money for the diamond, that

14 1

would be a deception, and that would be a crime; is that

15 J

correct?

16

A.

Yes.

17 1

Q.

But the other way around, you don't think

18|

it's a crime when you take a ring that is not yours, that

19i

you represent is a diamond, that you don't know whether

20 1

or not it's a diamond or not, and you give that to

211

someone, and they give you money for it, and even after

22 1

you find out for sure that it's a cubic zirconium, that

23 J

in your mind is not a crime, because Mrs. Davis should

24 J

have checked it?

25 1

A.

Is that your belief?

I believe that things should have been a lot
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11

more thouroughly gone through.

2
3

Q.

Do you think the police could have helped in

this situation?

4

A.

In pertaining

—

5I

Q.

By the police coming down, and just

6J

straightening things out, maybe taking the ring, taking

7I

the report, seeing if it had been switched, maybe

8

checking to see if there was a loose one karat diamond in

9I

the back room?

10

A.

I don't know if they did or didn't.

Ill

Q.

You could have called —

12 1

something about it, but you didn't.

13

you?

you could have done
You fled, didn't

14 1

A.

I did leave, yes.

15 1

Q.

You were in a hurry when you left?

16 1

A.

Not necessarily, no.

17 I

Q.

Used physical force so you could leave.

18 1

You

didn't want to stay there, did you?

19 J

A.

I didn't want to stay there, yes.

20 1

Q.

And you immediately left for Washington?

21

A.

No, I didn't.

22 J

Q.

Did you go to the police?

23

A.

Huh?

24 I

Q.

Once you had cooled down, did you go to the

25

police?
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11
2I

THE COURT:
about three times.

31

MR. MORGAN:

41

notes.

5I

done•

61
71

Mr. Morgan, you've asked this

I'm done.

Let me check my

One last thing, Your Honor.

Q.

(By Mr. Morgan)

I promise I'll be

You asked them to fix your

watch when you returned the second time; is that -correct?

81

A.

Yes.

91

Q.

And you indicated that nobody responded to

10

your request; is that correct?

Ill

A.

I don * t remember.

12 1

Q.

You didn't —

if you did testify that they

13

didn't really respond, then you're not sure about that?

14

They may have responded; might not have?

15 1
16 1
17 1
18 J
19 J
20 J
2l|

A.

I don't think anything was said right at the

moment, no.
Q.

All right.

So they responded, they may have

responded, may not have responded?
A.

They said they wanted the ring and the check

and the money, yes.
Q.

You have a pretty good memory when it comes

22 1

down to things that support your version. What's causing

23

the problems with your memory that support their version?

24

MR. REMAL:

Your Honor, I'd object.

251

THE COURT:

Objection sustained.
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1

MR. MORGAN:

2

THE COURT:

3

No further questions.
Redirect?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

41

By Ms. Remal:

5J

Q.

Dale, let's just try to review some of this.

61

When you went to the store the first time to the jewelry

71

store with the ring that's now Exhibit No. 1, did you

8J

know what the stone was that was in that ring?

9

A.

No.

10I

Q.

And was there anything that happened during

111

that first time you were at the store that made you

12 J

believe it was a diamond?

13 I
14 1
15 1

A.

The way they were looking at it through their

optics, and I was going on their expertise.
Q.

And when you left the store that first time

16|

with the check for $1,275 I think it is, and the watch,

17 1

and the other ring, which you had received in trade for

18 J

the ring you brought in, did you at that moment believe

19 1

that the ring you'd brought in had a diamond, and not a

20 1

zirconium in that ring?

21

A.

Yes.

22 I

Q.

And when you returned two or three hours

23 J

later with the problem with the watch, did you still

24 I

believe that that was a diamond based on what had

25

happened the first time you were there?
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